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ABSTRACT
In this article, we explain how the COVID-19 wicked crisis context
influences the quality of critically needed epistemic policy learn-
ing and undermines policy effectiveness. We explore those influ-
ences on two main dimensions: Vertically (pertaining to the
selection of core scientific advice) and horizontally (pertaining to
managing scientific interdisciplinarity). We apply the concept
using COVID-19 policy responses from England and Belgium, offer
an explanatory framework, and provide recommendations for pol-
icymakers, including (i) Crafting a policy-science-public narrative
maintaining independence, openness, and trust. (ii) Outlining the
limitations of science and public expectation setting. (iii)
Enhancing interdisciplinarity in policy formulation by utilizing
boundary and discipline-spanning structures, and systems think-
ing mechanisms for dynamic problem synthesis.
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A zigzagging rabbit, continuously recalculating its trajectory, learning from its sur-
roundings and the consequences of its actions. This image painted by Dunlop,
Radaelli, and Trein (2018) probably best captures the COVID-19 policy battle. Within
weeks of ambiguity and uncertainty, COVID-19 had rippling global implications from
health to social life to public policy and governance. The epidemiological novelty of
COVID-19 stretched healthcare systems to the breaking point (Heymann and Shindo
2020), thus calling into the battlefield other dimensions of public policy such as crisis
management, learning, and scientific knowledge (Weible et al. 2020).
In conditions of technical complexity and ambiguity, learning from a range of scien-
tific communities with statutory rights of consultation can be critical (Baekkeskov and
€Oberg 2017; Hulme 2012). The COVID-19 crisis constitutes an ideal case for the
research and practice of policy learning for two main reasons. First, COVID-19, being:
an intense global shock facilitating learning allowing the generation of insights through
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comparing approaches and lesson drawing (Rose 1991). Such shocks can facilitate
learning through the detection of systematic deficiencies, likely inducing policy change
(Gerber 2007; Schmidt and Radaelli 2004). Second, the nature of COVID-19 as a
“wicked” problem with multidimensional definitional and knowledge gaps (George
et al. 2020), no enumerable set of solutions, low failure tolerance, and strong temporal
constraints (Rittel and Webber 1973; Peters 2017). Such lack of definitional and solu-
tion clarity necessitates extensive learning among stakeholders (Head and Alford
2015). Here, learning can improve policymakers’ sensemaking and the ability to
address complex issues (Weible et al. 2020; Weick 1988). However, engaging in such
learning is not a straightforward endeavor as integrating scientific advice into policy
design and implementation is challenging, and consequences of sub-optimal learning
are taxing (Dunlop, James, and Radaelli 2020).
In this article, we assist policymakers to manage the integration of scientific know-
ledge into policy responses within wicked crisis contexts, which remains understudied
at this scale. We do so by answering the question of how can wicked crises compromise
the quality of epistemic policy learning? We argue that the inherent definitional charac-
teristics of such crises can compromise the quality of learning and undermine the
effectiveness of critical policy responses. To present our analysis, we synthesize a two-
dimensional factor termed “epistemic venue-shopping,” and empirically explore the
two dimensions contrasting cases from England and Belgium. With the COVID-19 cri-
sis still unfolding, and the risks of similar crises recurring, we offer recommendations
to practitioners to strengthen policy responses by opening a window into epistemic
policy learning in crises and shedding light on key dynamics.
In the next section, we identify the most functional mode of learning for the
COVID-19 crisis and synthesize our proposed factor. In Section 3, we present the
methods used. We provide case analysis in Section 4. Finally, recommendations and
conclusions in Section 5.
2. Synthesizing epistemic venue-shopping
2.1. A highly functional learning mode for COVID-19
While policy learning can strengthen policy responses facing crises (Birkland 2006),
dysfunctional or sub-optimal learning can worsen already complex situations leading
to policy failure (Dunlop, James, and Radaelli 2020). Hence, identifying a functional
learning mode is necessary for wicked crises where solutions applied cannot be undone
(Head and Alford 2015). We start by illustrating why epistemic policy learning (i.e.
learning from a “network of professionals with recognized expertise and competence in
a particular domain and an authoritative claim to policy-relevant knowledge” (Haas
1992)) is considered appropriate for a COVID-19 policy response. To do so, we utilize
Dunlop and Radaelli (2013) framework streamlining modes of policy learning as either
reflexive, epistemic, bargaining-oriented, or hierarchal, based on two dimensions: prob-
lem tractability, and certification of actors. This framework directly links the two fac-
tors at this study’s core; problem tractability (COVID-19) and certification of actors
(scientists) to identify functional learning modes. A problem of low tractability is of
high uncertainty. This resonates with the COVID-19 crisis as experts are still exploring
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its epidemiological characteristics, developing diagnostic, treatment, and vaccination
protocols (Heymann and Shindo 2020). Certification of actors describes the presence
of socially endorsed groups or organizations with scientific or expert authority to make
evaluative judgments. With significant technical complexity, scientists and specialized
research organizations constitute highly certified groups of actors for COVID-19 policy
responses (Weible et al. 2020). Hence, the COVID-19 crisis provides for a high certifi-
cation of actors and low tractability, placing it within the realm of epistemic policy
learning. Despite being a functional learning mode, we acknowledge that epistemic pol-
icy learning still entails challenges such as relating to representativeness and account-
ability (Jasanoff 2003).
2.2. Synthesizing epistemic venue-shopping
Here, we synthesize a two-dimensional factor termed “Epistemic venue-shopping”
referring to the policymakers’ process of identification, selection, and use of scientific
expertise in the policy formulation process within wicked crises. The vertical dimension
is concerned with selections within the core (primary) scientific discipline informing
policy. The horizontal dimension is concerned with selecting the range (multitude) of
scientific disciplines informing policy. At this stage, our use of “vertical” and
“horizontal” does not imply interaction effects between dimensions but rather visual-
izes intradisciplinary (vertical) versus interdisciplinary (horizontal) variations.
Though governments should carefully identify the range of expertise while employ-
ing epistemic learning (Craig 2019), we posit that the wicked crisis context can influ-
ence such identification and constrain the quality of learning. To offer our synthesis,
we draw on common attributes of the policy process theories converging on a context
of policymaking (wicked crisis), a political system (with legacies), problem definitions
(agenda setting), consideration of policy options (epistemic inputs), and policy imple-
mentation (Jordan 2001; Kingdon 1984; Easton 1965).
2.3. Vertical venue-shopping
We postulate that a wicked crisis can create influences leading to vertical epistemic
venue-shopping, thus affecting the selection of scientific approaches informing policy
formulation. These influences are facilitated by two sets of factors: the production, and
consumption (selection/use) of knowledge.
On the knowledge production front, epistemologists have subjective homegroup ori-
entations (Pattyn, Gouglas, and De Leeuwe 2020). Additionally, the multiplicity of sci-
entific approaches spurred by uncertainty is naturally higher in early-stage knowledge
development (Feynman 2005). This multiplicity creates an epistemic marketplace with
varying epistemological products for policymakers to “buy into,” a phenomenon
already observed in varying COVID-19 policy responses (Moon 2020).
On the knowledge selection and utilization front, epistemic knowledge and politics
are entangled (Straßheim 2020). Learning from scientists can be used to legitimize pre-
fabricated positions and serve political agendas (Weiss 1986), or fall victim to conflict-
ing sensemaking frames (Rubin and de Vries 2020). Here, notions of contingencies and
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self-reinforcements resulting from policy legacies come into play as policymakers likely
steer away from epistemic advice least consistent with their preferences (Heclo 1974;
Vergne and Durand 2010; Dunlop 2017). This can limit the range of scientific solutions
viable for policymakers to “buy into” as political considerations still exist during crises
(Craig 2019; Sibony 2020).
These factors can place policymakers in an “epistemic marketplace” with varying
“scientific products” and relatively high purchase power. The wicked crisis context
increases this power for three main reasons: First, the public space is less conducive for
disagreement and contestation as rapid responses are expected (Van Dooren and
Noordegraaf 2020). Second, the complex nature of the crisis limits contestation spaces
to groups of actors certified to participate in an informed debate (Dunlop and Radaelli
2013). Third, rapidly oscillating public attention cycles given the existence of compet-
ing for multi-dimensional issues resulting from the crisis (Silver 2019).
2.4. Horizontal venue-shopping
Core scientific knowledge of the COVID-19 crisis can position medical scientists as
primary producers of standards at the core of policy design (Dunlop and Radaelli
2013). However, it is likely insufficient to produce informed policy responses in multi-
faceted ambiguous contexts. Interdisciplinarity and multiplicity of perspectives improve
situational synthesis and sensemaking (Endsley 1997; Rubin and de Vries 2020).
However, this can be either overlooked or complex to identify given the ambiguity and
influences of such crises (Moynihan 2009). Adequate interdisciplinarity can be inhib-
ited by three main issues: First, the averseness to multiplicity to avoid confusion under
temporal pressure (Van Dooren and Noordegraaf 2020). Second, the difficulty of iden-
tification, given the ambiguity of wicked crises (Head and Alford 2015). Third, policy-
makers struggle to cope with information overload and identifying key epistemic
inputs to focus on (Jones and Baumgartner 2005; Bawden and Robinson 2009). Hence,
policymakers can be prone to forming myopic or conical views overlooking the multi-
faceted nature of the crisis-affected by overly selective interpretation of the environ-
ment and failure-inducing groupthink (Hart 1990). This can reduce the effectiveness of
policy instruments by overlooking their behavioral embeddedness within larger social
contexts. Implications of behavioral epistemology in terms of narratives, risk percep-
tion, and public engagement have established impacts on the acceptance of policies,
thus absorption and compliance (Jones and McBeth 2010; Silver 2019). Insights from
behavioral sciences can induce first-order changes (Hall 1986), leading to fine-tuning
policy instruments, thus improving social-fit, and consequently effectiveness. When
there are stronger behavioral implications, such insights can even invalidate the viabil-
ity of medically-driven policy measures if proven as socially impractical as such
responses are culturally mediated (Tyshenko and Paterson 2010). A COVID-19 impli-
cation entails overlooking the social embeddedness and behavioral consequences of
medically driven policy responses (such as social distancing and lockdowns). This is
despite knowing that community response and compliance with these policies are key
factors in defining their effectiveness (Hartley and Jarvis 2020; Moon 2020).
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3. Methods
We employ a plausibility probe as a methodological tool for refining and exploring the-
oretical propositions in early-stage hypothesis development (Eckstein 1975). We tri-
angulate inputs from public statements, news reports, standardized open expert
interviews, and official reports utilizing a thick descriptive approach. We concisely
define cases on the three-dimensional plane outlined by Rohlfing (2012): Temporal,
substantive, and actor-oriented. The use of narrative case studies is well-situated to
explore both the notions of contingency and interdisciplinarity (Garud, Kumaraswamy,
and Karnøe 2010).
We adopt an instrumental case study approach to provide exploratory insights con-
tributing to early-stage theory and concept formation (Stake 1995). A similar input, dif-
ferent outcome case selection strategy is employed (Gerring 2008). Both cases are of
countries considered to have under-performed in terms of containment as an outcome
of the crisis (relatively higher cases, deaths, and excess mortality). However, each of
them adopted different epistemic learning strategies and thus policy responses as
inputs (delayed lockdowns in England vs. stringent early lockdowns in Belgium). We
analyzed inputs from expert interviews using blended coding, thus maintaining theor-
etical focus and openness to explore expert (Salda~na 2015; Skjott Linneberg and
Korsgaard 2019).
4. Analysis
4.1. The case of England: vertical epistemic venue shopping
For better context on COVID-19 performance in England and Belgium, Table 1 pro-
vides a comparative view of key performance indicators for the two jurisdictions
among European COVID-19 hotspots.
In this case, we will focus on England as other nations of the UK exercised varying
degrees of autonomy in COVID-19 responses. The COVID-19 controversy in England
emerged with the initial policy response reported as driven by “herd immunity” (Grey
and MacAskill 2020; Sibony 2020). With public and scientific pressure, the government
considered delayed lockdowns. During the second week of March, the Oxford
Stringency Index logged an average stringency of 13 for the United Kingdom, while
Sweden (a no-lockdown exemplar) at 25, Belgium at 39, Spain at 50, and Italy at 71.
This is despite the UK having more cases than Belgium and Sweden at the time3.
Hence, the English response differed in approach then lagged in timing. Both of the
government’s policy responses were announced with the mantra of “following the sci-
ence” (Lee 2020). The delayed lockdown was presented as motivated by avoiding
“behavioural fatigue.” However, several experts criticized this approach claiming that
Table 1. Key COVID-19 performance indicators.
Country Cases1 (per 100,000) Deaths (per 100,000) Highest Excess mortality2
United Kingdom 456 69 39.86
Belgium 602 85.6 24.29
Italy 410.58 58.22 16.65
France 262.95 45.06 24.31
Spain 614.6 60.59 43.58
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the country’s death toll could have been drastically reduced if the lockdowns were
introduced earlier, a debate that gained traction in the UK parliament (Cooper 2020;
UK Parliament 2020). Interestingly, six hundred of the UK’s behavioral scientists con-
tested the government’s approach stating that behavioral fatigue is not sufficiently evi-
dence-based to justify delaying the lockdown (Sky News 2020a). Other experts likened
this to “playing roulette” with the public (Peat 2020). At the time of writing this article,
only 12 publications with “behavioural fatigue” in the “topic” field were found on the
Web of Science database, most of which were irrelevant to public health or social stud-
ies. Here, we observe a paradox where the government claims to have listened to sci-
ence, yet their approach remains: 1) Vastly opposed by the domain scientists from
which it has emerged. 2) Shown by different expert models to possibly lead to excessive
fatalities. This raises the question of what has likely contributed to the government’s
adoption of those policies?
Here, we explore if there are signs of policy legacy contingency possibly influencing
epistemic policy learning for COVID-19 by using decision patterns as initial indicators
(Garud, Kumaraswamy, and Karnøe 2010). We start with the tangible implications of
the government’s initial policy choices and their underlying political logic. An evident
implication of either response (herd immunity, then delayed lockdowns) is that the
economy remains relatively open, consequently enduring relatively less damage com-
pared to what would result from an early-on lockdown (The Guardian 2020a; Migone
2020). Evidently, there were recent similar patterns favoring economic growth in the
government’s paradigm. Our starting point on the path is a brief account of the eco-
nomic dimension’s salience in the Brexit discourse. Viewing the bedrock over which
the current policy system rose to power, we see the emphasis on a stronger economy
and job growth being a centerpiece of breaking away from the European Union
(Tendera-Wlaszczuk 2018; Dunlop, James, and Radaelli 2020). This emphasis contin-
ued to ripple, favoring market mechanisms, even extending to controversial debates
about the privatization of some healthcare services, (The Lancet Oncology 2019).
Interestingly, the Prime Minister articulated this emphasis within the COVID-19 con-
text in early February warning against letting the virus cause “unnecessary economic
damage” and calling on the UK to take off its “Clark Kent spectacles,” keep boundaries
open and emerge as a supercharged economic power (Prime Minister’s Office 2020).
This policy preference was also confirmed in our exploratory interviews. Yet, is it
plausible that this policy inclination and sensemaking frame proactively found a foot-
hold in science during the crisis? Literature shows that the extent to which policy-
makers listen to scientific advice can be influenced by its political ramifications.
Policymakers can identify/craft favorable lessons when existing ones are unfavorable
for their policy preferences (Dunlop 2017). To explore this possibility, we look at two
main dimensions of the UK’s COVID-19 epistemic policy learning: independence
(Dunlop and Radaelli 2018), transparency, and openness (Dunlop, James, and
Radaelli 2020).
The principles of giving scientific advice to the government ensure independence
from political influence, freedom to publish and transparent communication to the
public (Government Office for Science 2010). However, as the government sought
advice from the Scientific Advisory Group for Emergencies (SAGE), several challenges
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to those principles emerged. The group has a varying membership structure, which led
to concerns regarding the government’s influence on the committee’s memberships
and proceedings. Later it was found to have been attended by- and included civil serv-
ants, senior political advisors to the Prime Minister with significant absences of virolo-
gists and public health experts (Lee 2020). This was viewed as convenient for the
government’s predetermined policy orientation and a “mockery” of the committee’s
ability to give independent advice (Lawrence, Carrell, and Pegg 2020; Scally, Jacobson,
and Abbasi 2020). SAGE was also criticized for transparency and openness as commit-
tee memberships were largely kept secret until later leaked (The Guardian 2020b).
Several scientists argued that this denied it rigor and discounted trust by creating a
“black box” with an interplay of scientists and civil servants that cannot be scientifically
scrutinized (The Guardian 2020c, 2020d, 2020e; Sky News 2020b). Furthermore,
SAGE’s proceedings have largely been kept secret which stirred criticism. As the gov-
ernment attempted to weather the storm, it published some minutes of SAGE discus-
sions. However, they came heavily redacted which “infuriated” several committee
members claiming that redactions deliberately concealed scientific criticism of policies
the government had asked them to consider (Daily Mail 2020). As experts urged for
stricter measures, on the 19th of March, the government downgraded the COVID-19
threat level, thus lowering the required standards of personal protective equipment
(Scally, et. al, 2020). Similar maneuvers and issues of transparency were observed con-
cerning the release of Brexit impact assessments amidst attempts to downplay expert
estimations (Dunlop, James, and Radaelli 2020). Retrospectively, countering aspects of
unfavorable expert advice was clearly articulated leading up to the Brexit referendum
by the current Minister for the Cabinet Office Michael Gove saying: “I think the people
of this country have had enough of experts” (Portes 2017).
Driven by the need for transparent, evidence-based, and open advice, a group of
leading British scientists set up an “Independent (SAGE).” In their reports, they corro-
borated the aforementioned issues critiquing the government’s “potentially dangerous”
and “counter-productive” ambivalence in suppressing transmission in favor of manag-
ing spread (entailing lighter economic impact). They cited concerns over “inaccurate,
incomplete and selective data presented by government officials” and over-dependence
on outsourcing to the private sector. They also called for ensuring independence, trans-
parency, and trustworthiness of data and scientific advice (The Independent
SAGE 2020).
Fueled by the wicked crisis context, we clearly observe tangible influences exerted by
the government on the independence and transparency of COVID-19 scientific advice
in a favorable direction of established policy legacies. Hence, we find there is a plausi-
bility that the economic predispositions of policymakers and the ensuing sensemaking
frames have influenced the identification and selection of COVID-19 scientific advice.
4.2. The case of Belgium: horizontal epistemic venue shopping
Belgium was a frontrunner in COVID-19 policy responses, even before Spain and just
five days after France and Italy (University of Oxford 2020). However, Table 1 shows
that the country has some of the highest cases and deaths per capita in Europe
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and worldwide. A recent report by The Economist (2020) ranked Belgium as the worst
in terms of “quality of policy response to the pandemic.” Belgian officials explain the
numbers in light of the government’s decision to include suspected (confirmed by a
doctor) but untested deaths (De Block 2020). While disagreements on measurement
strategies can persist, there is consensus on the importance of effective lockdown and
social distancing policies. As such effectiveness is largely moderated by voluntary
and consistent citizen compliance, policymakers strive to maintain public compliance
and avoid the degradation of caution. As illustrated earlier, behavioral epistemology
plays a significant role in achieving this objective. Here, we evaluate two aspects: (1)
Whether such degradation and issues of compliance have been observed? (2) Prima
facie indicators of the extent to which behavioral epistemology was present in the pol-
icy formulation process.
First, we look at indicators of compliance to social distancing, stay at home orders,
and lockdowns by triangulating primary indicators such as mobility data, expert inter-
views, and news sources. As the government decided to enforce a lockdown in March,
several groups rushed to arrange last-minute “lockdown parties,” an issue that a mem-
ber of the government’s Risk Assessment Group described as by people who “do not
clearly get the message” (Het Laatste Nieuws 2020). Data from the Flemish road
authority show that while road traffic dropped from February to April by around
58.8%, it started increasing from April to May by around 46%. Data obtained from one
of the country’s largest transport providers show a similar trend from April to May.
This was observed while no substantial changes to stay at home policies, restrictions on
domestic travel, or gatherings were made (University of Oxford 2020). Additionally,
there was an overall rise of non-essential travel during the same period (Brzozowski
2020a). By late April, the government had issued over 60,000 lockdown violation noti-
ces with the number of violations reportedly rising (The Brussels Times 2020a;
Brzozowski 2020b). Though issuing violation notices entails a discretionary aspect, a
comparative view can still provide perspective. The number of lockdown violations
issued in England until the 8th of June (a nation five times the population of Belgium
with comparative policy stringency) stood at 15,715 (NPCC 2020). As the government
proceeded to ease the lockdown, more compliance issues emerged. An example can be
seen in the city of Antwerp becoming a hotspot for COVID-19 infections, necessitating
a strict lockdown and rendering the city, then later the entire country “code orange”
(The Brussels Times 2020b; Euronews 2020). Other incidents such as large-scale alter-
cations with the police while attempting to enforce social distancing rules prompted
debates around canceling trains and restricting access to several towns (The Brussels
Times 2020c).
Second, we explore whether there was a tangible presence of behavioral epistemol-
ogy at the forefront of the COVID-19 policy formulation. We do so by surveying the
fourteen national advisory committees established by the government to manage the
crisis (Belgian Government 2020; Office of the Prime Minister 2020). The significant
number of committees and ensuing coordination issues came later to be known as
Belgium’s COVID-19 labyrinth (De Standaard 2020). Such issues are familiar in the
Belgian context given its institutional configurational complexity (Witte 1992). This
resulted in a fragmented workflow and a “lack of well-thought structure,” leadership
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and coordination as confirmed in our interview with a scientific advisor on one of the
committees. This came in contrast to the need for superordinate management struc-
tures to coordinate multi-group responses during crises (Doyle, Paton, and Johnston
2015). While only one of those groups had a publicly available membership listing, a
clear observation could be made through consolidating functional descriptions, expert
interviews, and secondary sources; behavioral epistemology was largely absent at the
forefront. For example, though exiting the lockdown entails significant behavioral
implications; the Group of Experts on the Exit Strategy (GEES) did not include behav-
ioral expertise (mostly medical experts and economists). Recently, the group has shut
down amidst growing criticism of medical epistemology dominance to the point at
which “all balance was lost” (Heynderickx 2020). Their task fell to “CELEVAL,” an
almost exclusively medical group of experts. This does not necessarily mean that no
behavioral scientists were consulted during the crisis. However, it is an indicator of the
absence of such expertise at the forefront of an issue with significant behavioral impli-
cations. Interviewing a leading scientist advising the government on one of the com-
mittees, they indicated that the scientific view consulted was “too narrow” and that
“behavioural science has not been put to the forefront.” This was corroborated in
another interview with a leading scholar in social psychology and psychosocial health
risks, echoing concerns regarding the lack of behavioral expertise and “tailored
communication” leaving several cultural, ethnic, social groups, and even youth out.
Another leading medical expert providing recommendations on the crisis emphasized
the consequences of communication deficiency as leading to the viral spread becoming
“less visible” to the public after easing the lockdown. Though respondents agreed that
the civil service worked diligently during the crisis, all respondents have expressed
varying degrees of concern regarding communication and behavioral sciences insights
in maintaining trust and compliance.
Through triangulating sources, we believe there is plausibility to the assumption that
the ambiguous hard-hitting nature of the crisis has contributed to policymakers form-
ing a narrow view of scientific expertise needed during the crisis. This had negative
implications for public compliance to COVID-19 policy responses.
5. Recommendations and conclusion
In this article, our analysis establishes the plausible influences of fast-burning wicked
crises on the quality of epistemic policy learning and highlights key implications of
such influences for policy design and implementation. Here, we do not aim to create
league table comparisons or epidemiologically to assess COVID-19 responses.
However, we employ illustrative cases elucidating policymaking dynamics to enhance
future policy responses.
To facilitate the evaluative use of our analysis in other jurisdictions, we offer an
exploratory analytical framework for epistemic policy learning in crisis (Figure 1),
building on a similar structural approach proposed by Dunlop and Radaelli (2013) for
policy learning genera. Here, we view an analytical framework as an explanatory struc-
ture providing means to organize descriptive and analytical inquiry (Goyal and
Howlett 2019). This simplified framework assists policymakers to assess the
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inclusiveness of epistemic policy learning during wicked crises and accommodates for
cross-case comparisons. It also facilitates assessing the relative impacts of different
institutional and structural factors on learning. Our proposed dimensions yield four
variants of epistemic policy learning inclusiveness: Minimal Spectrum, Maximal
Spectrum, Vertically Oriented, and Horizontally Oriented. Here, no normative assump-
tion should be made for a globally optimum variant, yet each case necessitates a
deliberate assessment of a most functional approach considering several crises and con-
text-specific parameters (e.g. scale, scope, and nature of the crisis, tradeoffs, system
context, etc.).
We contrasted two cases; the case of England as an example of vertical epistemic
venue-shopping with low multiplicity in the core discipline informing policy design,
and the case of Belgium as an example of horizontal epistemic venue-shopping with
low involvement of multiple disciplines.
5.1. Vertical epistemic venue-shopping
Vertically, at the beginning of the pandemic, England almost exclusively relied on a
single-minded epistemic approach. Given our findings, we offer the following recom-
mendations particularly within contexts with high levels of political conflict.
5.1.1. Maintaining transparency, independence, and openness
Transparency, independence, and openness remain core scope conditions of epistemic
policy learning (Dunlop, James, and Radaelli 2020). Our analysis also shows them as
prima facie indicators of apolitical and non-contingent use of science. As crisis condi-
tions can provide conditions to potentially compromise transparency and openness, we
Figure 1. Epistemic dimensions of policy learning in crises.
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propose including the existence of independent and trusted public-facing scientific
institutions as an additional scope condition. In the case of England, independent fore-
casts by trusted institutions expanded the necessary space for scientific argumentation
and scrutiny leading to policy re-alignment (Adam 2020; Nature 2020). Here, we side-
step the debate of whether the policy reversal was epidemiologically optimal and shed
light on the dynamic by which it was induced. The absence of identified scope condi-
tions renders scientific expertise vulnerable to varying political sensemaking frames
and facilitates the instrumental use of science.
5.1.2. The politics of using science
Our analysis shows that persisting Brexit era political logics (e.g. high levels of political
conflict and a strong focus on economic growth) leading up to the pandemic created a
substantial policy legacy constraining the set of viable policy solutions. Yet, England is
not by any means an outlier. Though operationalized differently, similar responses (e.g.
The United States, Brazil) can be observed in systems where policymakers have limited
(or even single salient) pre-crisis policy priorities (e.g. economic growth) adopt
“divergent” COVID-19 scientific advice. There, policymakers might be more inclined
to craft favorable epistemic lessons if the outcomes of existing lessons are likely to
impact their pre-crisis policy priorities. Such legacies (and ensuing sensemaking
frames) can constrain their ability to neutrally uphold the epistemic learning process.
Subsequently, such systems might prefer low vertical and horizontal varieties for better
control over learning outcomes. This can be moderated by the institutionally available
policymaker span of control over the learning process described by Dunlop and
Radaelli (2013). This does not necessarily imply that divergent approaches to COVID-
19 are scientifically lacking but necessitates an evaluation of their underlying political-
scientific interactions within the context of pre-crisis agendas, intra-crisis impacts, and
substantiation of grounded scientific approaches. Under those conditions, proactively
ensuring transparency and openness of epistemic policy learning enhances public per-
ception of the legitimacy of government policy and its logic. This helps policymakers
avoid uninformed public scrutiny, distrust and relieves them from engaging in random
strategic shifts in response to public pressure.
5.1.3. Public expectation setting
While “following the science” is a legitimate mantra, the limitations of science should
be appropriately communicated (to policymakers and the public). Policymakers and
the public are used to consolidated and harmonious scientific advice cumulated
through prolonged internal debate; this is not necessarily feasible in a fast-burning cri-
sis with knowledge uncertainty. As scientific knowledge is updated through the crisis,
failing to dynamically delineate its limitations to the public depreciates the credibility
of science and limits influence on public compliance. Intra-crisis, this can critically
limit the influence of science in convincing the public to accept a COVID-19 vaccine
or comply with strict measures against the next waves. Carefully crafted narratives can
play a critical role in addressing this issue as established in other COVID-19 govern-
ance issues (Mintrom and O’Connor 2020).
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5.2. Horizontal epistemic venue-shopping
Ambiguity and uncertainty in wicked crises complicate situational synthesis, and thus
the identification of relevant expertise. Here, we make the following three main prac-
tice-oriented recommendations utilizing organizational and institutional tools that can
be applied in a relatively reasonable time given the situational urgency of crises.
5.2.1. The science of choosing science: dynamic problem synthesis across networks
Investing in continuous problem synthesis and definition can help policymakers cap-
ture the dynamism and fluidity of the crisis (as scientific expertise needed also varied
intra-crisis). Systems thinking and open deliberation through the boundary and discip-
line-spanning epistemic networks can empower learning and mitigate the effects of
echo chambers in wicked settings (Boucher 2017; Wagner and Yl€a-Anttila 2020. This
enhances high-resolution situational synthesis, problem recognition, and thus optimal
solution-oriented agenda setting during and after crises (Shpaizman 2020). This also
goes beyond identifying disciplines into intra-disciplinarily identifying state-of-the-art
scientifically grounded streams.
5.2.2. Managing the interdisciplinary mix
Identifying and institutionally managing an optimum context-appropriate and crisis
contingent “interdisciplinary mix” beyond bureaucratic norms of institutional com-
plexity is critical. The lack thereof could lead to siloed thinking and breakdowns in the
scientific debate underlying policy formulation as observed in the case of GEES. Policy
systems with complex institutional settings (such as in Belgium) can yield a labyrinth
of advisory committees with challenges in coordination and integration of insights,
thus rendering attempts for interdisciplinarity ineffective (even when multiple disci-
plines could be officially involved). This mandates the consideration of effective super-
ordinate integration and management structures beyond simply tallying multiple
disciplines.
5.2.3. The science of using science
While policymakers are naturally not trained in domain-specific sciences, time-sensi-
tive investment in sensitizing them to the limitations and underpinnings of those scien-
ces can be of value. This helps them cope with the uncertainty of emerging knowledge
and improves their ability to use scientific advice in policy formulation and public
communication. During crises, it is tempting to undertake epistemic learning as a one-
shot “check-the-box” political self-preservation exercise and ignore its dialectic nature
as a continuous, interlinked, and iterative process.
6. Conclusions
The crisis has shown that though tensions exist in the policymakers-scientists dynamic,
science remained central to policy formulation. Moderately present, such tensions are
fathomable signs of a natural discourse gap between different sensemaking frames
(Rubin and de Vries 2020). This emphasizes the need for a deliberately tailored, crisis-
specific “policy-science-public” discourse balancing the policymakers’ openness to
26 B. L. ZAKI AND E. WAYENBERG
science, its independence, and maintaining public trust in the trifecta. Here, the vertical
and horizontal dimensions of epistemic policy learning are entwined where science not
only contributes to the provision of policy knowledge but also to the design and man-
agement of both the internal policymaker-scientist and public-facing narratives.
Given our findings, we recommend investing intellectual resources in furthering the
research agenda on epistemic policy learning in crises, particularly to elaborate on
scope conditions and determinants for different variants identified. Additionally, study-
ing the structural influences of wicked crises on this learning modality can help policy-
makers maintain context-appropriate integration of scientific advice into the policy
formulation and implementation processes.
Notes
1. Cases and deaths data obtained from WHO Sit-rep 195 as of 2nd of August 2020
2. Excess mortality data obtained from Euromomo, as of 2nd of August 2020
3. Data obtained from WHO Sit-rep 54 as of 14th of March 2020
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